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To study the long-run effect of dividend taxation on aggregate capital accumulation, we build a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which there is a continuum of firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. We find that a dividend tax cut raises aggregate productivity by reducing the frictions in the
reallocation of capital across firms. Our baseline model simulations show that when both dividend
and capital gains tax rates are cut from 25 and 20 percent, respectively, to the same 15 percent level
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miaoj@bu.edu1 Introduction
Dividends are taxed at both the corporate and personal levels in the United States. This
double taxation of dividends may distort investment e¢ ciency. Partly motivated by this con-
sideration, the United States Congress enacted the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (JGTRRA) in 2003. This act reduced the tax rates on dividends and capital gains and
eliminated the wedge between these two tax rates through 2008. Because one primary goal of
JGTRRA is to promote long-run capital formation, these tax cuts could be made permanent.
In this paper, we ask the following question: What is the quantitative long-run e⁄ect of the
2003 dividend tax reform on aggregate capital accumulation?
This question is of signi￿cant interest to both economists and policymakers. Economists
disagree about the economic e⁄ects of dividend taxation on investment. Two views are preva-
lent.1 The key consideration is the marginal source of investment ￿nance. Under the ￿new
view,￿￿rms use internal funds to ￿nance investment and do not raise new equity. Thus, divi-
dend taxation does not in￿ uence the user cost of capital and investment (Auerbach (1979a,b),
Bradford (1981), and King (1977)). Under the ￿traditional view,￿the marginal source of funds
is new equity and the return to investment is used to pay dividends. A dividend tax cut reduces
the user cost of capital and hence raises investment. Empirical evidence on these two views
is inconclusive. For example, Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985) ￿nd evidence supporting the
traditional view using data from the UK, and Desai and Goolsbee (2004) ￿nd evidence support-
ing the new view using data from the US. However, Auerbach and Hassett (2002) show that
in US data ￿rms behave according to both views, an indication of substantial heterogeneity in
the data.
Our paper builds on the existing literature on dividend taxation in two distinct ways.
First, we embed the traditional single-￿rm model used in empirical studies in a computable
dynamic general equilibrium framework.2 Second, we incorporate a continuum of heterogeneous
1There is the third ￿tax irrelevance￿view proposed by Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982). According to this
view, marginal investors do not face di⁄erential tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Thus, dividend taxation
has no e⁄ect on investment. This view has been generally rejected by empirical evidence. See Auerbach (2002),
Gordon and Dietz (2006), or Poterba and Summers (1985) for an exposition of the three views.
2See Auerbach (1979a) for an early overlapping generations model of dividend taxation with a single ￿rm.
See Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987) for an important comprehensive study of ￿scal policy in dynamic general
equilibrium models. Also see Barro (1989) and Baxter and King (1993) for a general equilibrium analysis of
government purchases and the ￿nancing of these purchases.
1￿rms in the model. These ￿rms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks.3 This ￿rm
heterogeneity plays a key role in our analysis. Speci￿cally, at any point in time, depending
on its productivity and its capital stock, a ￿rm ￿nds itself in one of three ￿nance regimes.
In the equity issuance regime, the marginal source of ￿nance is new equity, which re￿ ects the
traditional view of dividend taxation. In the dividend distribution regime, the marginal source
of ￿nance is retained earnings, which re￿ ects the new view of dividend taxation. Finally, in
the liquidity constrained regime, the ￿rm￿ s investment is limited to the amount of retained
earnings. Importantly, because of ￿rm heterogeneity, at any point in time di⁄erent ￿rms may
be in di⁄erent ￿nance regimes, and hence respond to the dividend tax cut in di⁄erent ways.
We show that if there were a representative ￿rm in the economy, dividend taxation would
have no e⁄ect on long-run capital accumulation, and this highlights the importance of hetero-
geneity to our results. A representative ￿rm would, in a deterministic steady state, behave
according to the new view of dividend taxation and would use internal funds rather than eq-
uity as its source of ￿nancing. We document empirical evidence that ￿rms￿investment and
￿nancing patterns are di⁄erent in di⁄erent ￿nance regimes, and that the distribution of ￿rms
across di⁄erent ￿nance regimes changed following the 2003 tax reform. This evidence supports
our model mechanism.
We use our calibrated model to provide a quantitative evaluation of the long-run e⁄ects
of the dividend and capital gains tax cuts enacted in 2003.4 We assume that the benchmark
tax system in the initial steady state re￿ ects the federal statutory tax rates in 2003 before the
tax cuts. Because the redistributive e⁄ect of the tax cuts is not our focus of study, we assume
that there is a representative household who owns all ￿rms in the model. This household has
an average income which falls in the 25 percent federal income tax bracket in 2003. It then
faces the 25 percent dividend tax rate and the 20 percent capital gains tax rate under the 2003
tax system before the tax cuts.5 In our baseline model, we suppose that the 2003 tax cuts are
permanent, lowering both dividends and capital gains tax rates to the 15 percent level. In this
3In the empirical industrial organization literature, many researchers have found ￿rm level productivity
di⁄erences are large and persistent (see Bartelsman and Dunne (2001) for a survey).
4The Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) uses several models to evaluate JGTRRA. CBO￿ s (2003) estimates
are based on an average of model results using two sets of model inputs with one set re￿ ecting the traditional
view and the other set re￿ ecting the new view.
5Although dividend taxes are skewed towards upper income households, our calibrated 25 percent tax rate
is not too low since a large share of equity is held by low-tax institutional investors such as pension funds (see
Poterba (2004)).
2case, the long-run aggregate capital stock rises by about 4 percent. When we restrict the tax
cut to dividends alone, the e⁄ect is much smaller: A permanent reduction of the dividend tax
rate from 25 to 20 percent raises the long-run capital stock by about 0.5 percent. We show that
these increases may be smaller when we extend the baseline model to incorporate a revenue-
neutral shift from dividend taxation to labor income taxation, debt ￿nancing, transactions
costs of external ￿nance, and share repurchases.
We ￿nd that a dividend tax cut has a reallocation e⁄ect that generates productivity gains
because the dividend tax acts as a friction in the allocation of capital. The intuition is that
after a dividend tax cut, some previously liquidity constrained ￿rms move to the equity is-
suance regime. These ￿rms are more productive, issue new equity, and invest in more capital.
Removing the wedge between the tax rate on dividends and the tax rate on capital gains makes
the allocation of factors across ￿rms more e¢ cient.
The general equilibrium price feedback e⁄ect is important for our results. Speci￿cally,
the increase in aggregate capital raises the aggregate demand for labor and hence raises the
equilibrium wage. The increased wage lowers pro￿ts and the returns to investment and thus
dampens the positive e⁄ect of the dividend and capital gains tax cuts. To assess the dampening
e⁄ect of general equilibrium price movements quantitatively, we ￿x the wage rate at its level
prior to the tax cuts and show that the increase in aggregate capital after the tax cuts in partial
equilibrium could be six times larger than that in general equilibrium.
Our paper is related to a vast literature on investment and dividend taxation in public
￿nance, corporate ￿nance, and macroeconomics. To our knowledge, our paper provides the
￿rst computable dynamic general equilibrium model with ￿rm heterogeneity to evaluate the
2003 dividend tax cut. We show both heterogeneity and general equilibrium price movements
are critical to a proper quantitative assessment of this issue. Our model framework is related to
Gomes (2001), who analyzes the issue of investment-cash ￿ ow sensitivity,6 although, in contrast
to our work, he does not address taxation or tax policy. We extend his model to incorporate
both personal and corporate taxation as well as adjustment costs. While both models feature
three ￿nance regimes, the three ￿nance regimes in our model are generated through di⁄erential
tax treatments on dividends and capital gains, as opposed to transaction costs of external
6There is a large empirical literature on the investment-cash ￿ ow sensitivity (e.g., Cooper and Ejarque (2003),
Fazzari et al. (1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hennessy and Whited (2007), and Moyen (2004)). This
literature argues that external ￿nance is costly because of taxes, asymmetric information, and transactions costs.
3￿nancing modeled in Gomes (2001).
Our paper is also related to House and Shapiro (2006), who analyze the quantitative e⁄ects
of the timing of the tax rate changes enacted in 2001 and 2003. Unlike our paper, they assume
a representative ￿rm in the model and do not consider the question we analyzed here. Korinek
and Stiglitz (2008) provide a partial equilibrium model to study the e⁄ects of dividend taxation
on investment. They show that ￿rm heterogeneity implies that a dividend tax cut has a small
e⁄ect on aggregate investment. Unlike our model, their model lacks the general equilibrium
mechnasim.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents evidence on the
changes in corporate behavior after the 2003 dividend tax cut. Section 3 sets up the model.
Section 4 analyzes a single ￿rm￿ s decision problem and the e⁄ects of dividend taxation in partial
equilibrium. Section 5 provides quantitative results. Section 6 considers several extensions.
Section 7 concludes. Technical details regarding model solution and data construction are
relegated to appendices.
2 Empirical Evidence on Corporate Behavior from the 2003
Dividend Tax Cut
The 2003 JGTRRA makes two major changes in tax law. First, the capital gains tax rate
is reduced from the previous 20 percent for individuals in the top four tax brackets (facing
marginal tax rates of 25, 28, 33 and 35 percent) to 15 percent. It is reduced from the previous
10 percent for individuals in the lower two tax brackets (facing marginal tax rates of 10 and
15 percent) to 5 percent. Second, dividends are taxed at the same rate as capital gains. In
particular, dividends are taxed at the rate of 15 percent for individuals in the top four tax
brackets. Dividends were previously taxed as regular income. In this section, we document
empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of the 2003 dividend tax cut on corporate investment and
￿nancing behavior. This evidence complements the ￿ndings of Chetty and Saez (2005). Our
data are drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. Appendix A describes the construction of
our data in detail.
We sort ￿rms according to their ￿nance regimes: ￿rms distributing dividends (dividend dis-
tribution regime), ￿rms issuing new equity but not paying dividends (equity issuance regime),
and ￿rms neither issuing new equity nor paying dividends (liquidity constrained regime). Be-
4cause many ￿rms in our data issue very small amounts of equity, we say that a ￿rm issues new
equity if the ratio of equity issuance to the capital stock is greater or equal to 2%.7 We ￿nd
that about 20 percent of ￿rms in our data in any given year both distribute dividends and issue
new equity. This behavior is puzzling for the standard theory based on taxes, since it implies
that there exists a pro￿table opportunity to reduce both dividends and equity issuance. As
Bond and Meghir (1994) argue, the observed behavior may be explained by transactions costs
or signaling theory (e.g., Bhattacharya (1979)). Since the objective of our study is not on the
preceding ￿dividend puzzle,￿we group these ￿rms into the dividend distribution regime.
We compute the investment-to-capital ratio in any year for ￿rms in each ￿nance regime as
their total investment in that year divided by their total capital in that year. Similarly, we
compute ratios of earnings to capital and Tobin￿ s q in a year for ￿rms in each ￿nance regime.
Table 1 presents the average across years from 1988 to 2002 before the dividend tax cut.
Table 1. Distribution of ￿rms across ￿nance regimes in the data (average over 1988-
2002). The share of ￿rms for a regime is equal to the total number of ￿rms in that regime
divided by the total number of ￿rms in all regimes. The share of capital (resp. investment)
for a regime is equal to the total capital stock (resp. investment) of the ￿rms in that regime
divided by aggregate capital stock (resp. investment) of all ￿rms. The earnings-capital ratio
for a regime is equal to the earnings of the ￿rms in that regime divided by their total capital
stock, i.e. it is capital-weighted. The investment-capital ratio and Tobin￿ s q are computed in a
similar way.
Equity Liquidity Dividend
issuance regime constrained regime distribution regime
Share of ￿rms 0.230 0.297 0.474
Share of capital 0.028 0.059 0.913
Share of investment 0.039 0.057 0.904
Earnings-capital ratio 0.567 0.275 0.355
Investment-capital ratio 0.290 0.193 0.194
Tobin￿ s q 3.768 1.784 2.837
Table 1 reveals that, on average, about half of the ￿rms pay dividends. The rest is divided
into two approximately equal-sized groups: ￿rms which issue equity, and ￿rms which do not.
7Changing this threshold to 1% does not a⁄ect our results signi￿cantly.
5Consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Lyandres, Sun,
and Zhang (2007)), this table shows that ￿rms issuing equity are signi￿cantly more productive
than the rest, as measured by the earnings-to-capital ratio. These ￿rms are small (measured
by capital) and have high Tobin￿ s q: Apparently, these ￿growth ￿rms￿ are productive, have
good investment opportunities, and require external ￿nance to make investments. The two
other groups have similar investments, but the ￿rms paying dividends have higher Tobin￿ s q
and higher productivity.
Turn to the corporate behavior after the 2003 dividend tax cut. We ￿nd that aggregate
dividends increased signi￿cantly as documented by Chetty and Saez (2005). According to the
National Income and Product Accounts, the ratio of dividends to GDP increased from 3.86
percent (the average over 1988-2002) to 5.29 percent (the average over 2003-2006). In our
COMPUSTAT sample, the aggregate dividend-capital ratio jumped up in 2004, as displayed
in the top left panel of Figure 1. The other three panels in the ￿gure reveal that aggregate
equity issuance, aggregate investment, and aggregate earnings (all normalized by the aggregate
capital stock) rose signi￿cantly, following the 2003 dividend tax cut. In addition, the four
panels in Figure 1 show that the aggregate dividend-to-capital ratio is relatively smooth, but
the aggregate equity issuance-to-capital, investment-to-capital, and earnings-to-capital ratios
are procyclical and highly volatile.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We ￿nally consider the cross-sectional statistics after the dividend tax cut for the sample
period from 2004 to 2006. Table 2 presents the results. We see that the number of ￿rms issuing
equity rose after the 2003 dividend tax cut. These ￿rms account for a larger share of aggregate
investment. In addition, the number of ￿rms paying dividends also rose. This evidence is
consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Chetty and Saez (2005).
Table 2. Distribution of ￿rms across ￿nance regimes in the data (average over 2004-
2006) The share of ￿rms for a regime is equal to the total number of ￿rms in that regime
divided by the total number of ￿rms in all regimes. The share of capital (resp. investment)
for a regime is equal to the total capital stock (resp. investment) of the ￿rms in that regime
divided by aggregate capital stock (resp. investment) of all ￿rms. The earnings-capital ratio
6for a regime is equal to the earnings of the ￿rms in that regime divided by their total capital
stock, i.e. it is capital-weighted. The investment-capital ratio and Tobin￿ s q are computed in a
similar way.
Equity Liquidity Dividend
issuance regime constrained regime distribution regime
Share of ￿rms 0.283 0.173 0.544
Share of capital 0.034 0.070 0.896
Share of investment 0.044 0.057 0.900
Earnings-capital ratio 0.784 0.336 0.455
Investment-capital ratio 0.231 0.148 0.182
Tobin￿ s q 3.396 1.913 2.876
Figure 2 plots the shares of ￿rms in each ￿nance regime since 1988. Following the 2003
dividend tax cut, the share of ￿rms in the liquidity constrained regime fell and the shares of
￿rms in the equity issuance and dividend distribution regimes rose. In the next section, we will
present a model that produces this e⁄ect. We will show that the change in the ￿rm distribution
across ￿nance regimes is important for understanding our model mechanism.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
3 The Model
We embed a standard investment model with adjustment costs widely used in the literature
of dividend taxation (e.g., Desai and Goolsbee (2004), Fazzari et al. (1988), and Poterba and
Summers (1983, 1985)) in a general equilibrium framework similar to Gomes (2001). The
model economy consists of a continuum of corporate ￿rms, a representative household, and a
government. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;::: Assume that there is no aggregate
uncertainty and that ￿rms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. By a law of large numbers,
all aggregate quantities and prices are deterministic over time, although at the ￿rm level each
￿rm still faces idiosyncratic uncertainty. We will focus on steady-state stationary equilibrium
in which all aggregate variables are constant over time.
3.1 Firms
We begin by describing the ￿rms￿decision problem. Firms are ex ante identical and are subject
to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. They di⁄er ex post in that they may experience di⁄erent
7histories of productivity shocks. Assume that these shocks are generated by a Markov process
with transition function given by Q : Z ￿ Z ! [0;1]; where (Z;Z) is a measurable space.
In order to focus on the key issue of dividend taxation in the simplest possible way, we
make two assumptions. First, we consider ￿ at taxes with full loss o⁄set provisions as in most
papers in the literature. In particular, we assume that ￿rms face corporate income tax at the
constant rate ￿c; while individuals face constant tax rates ￿d on dividends, ￿i on labor and
interest income, and ￿g on accrued capital gains.8 Second, we abstract from debt and assume
that ￿rms are all equity ￿nanced as in Auerbach and Hassett (2002), Desai and Goolsbee
(2004), and Poterba and Summers (1985). Incorporating debt ￿nancing would complicate our
analysis since we would need to include debt as an additional state variable in the dynamic
programming problem (8) below. A simple way to incorporate debt ￿nancing is to assume
that a ￿xed fraction of capital is ￿nanced by debt as in Poterba and Summers (1983). We will
consider this extension in Section 6.2.
Because all ￿rms are ex ante identical, we ￿rst consider a single ￿rm￿ s decision problem
and then study aggregation. In order to formulate this problem, we ￿rst derive the ￿rm￿ s
equity valuation equation. Let the ex-dividend equity value be Pt at date t: In equilibrium, the












where Et [￿] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the ￿rm￿ s history of idiosyncratic
shocks, Rt denotes the required return to equity, dt+1 is the ￿rm￿ s dividend payment, and P0
t+1
is the period t + 1 value of equity outstanding in period t: The ￿rm may issue new shares or
repurchase old shares. Thus, equity value at date t+1 satis￿es Pt+1 = P0
t+1 +st+1; where st+1
denotes the value of issued new shares (repurchases) if st+1 ￿ (<)0: Many researchers argue
that external equity ￿nancing is costly due to asymmetric information or transactions costs. In
the baseline model here, we do not consider such costly external ￿nancing. Instead, we consider
this issue in Section 6.3.
We will show later that since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the steady-state equilibrium
required return to equity satis￿es:
Rt = (1 ￿ ￿i)r: (2)
8In the U.S., capital gains are taxed on realization rather than on accrual. Incorporating a realization-based
capital gains tax would complicate our analysis signi￿cantly and is not important in this context.
8where r is the steady-state equilibrium interest rate. Using equations (1)-(2), we can derive:
Pt [(1 ￿ ￿i)r + 1 ￿ ￿g] = Et [(1 ￿ ￿d)dt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿g)(Pt+1 ￿ st+1)]: (3)
We de￿ne the cum-dividend equity value Vt+1 as:








dt ￿ st +
Et [Vt+1]
1 + r(1 ￿ ￿i)=(1 ￿ ￿g)
: (5)
We will use this equation to formulate the ￿rm￿ s dynamic programming problem.
The ￿rm combines labor and capital to produce output. Suppose the ￿rm has a decreasing-
returns-to-scale production function given by F (k;l;z); where k, l; and z denote capital, labor
and productivity shock, respectively. Assume that F (￿) is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions. We can then derive the operating pro￿t function
￿ (k;z;w) by solving the following static labor choice problem:
￿ (k;z;w) = max
l￿0
fF (k;l;z) ￿ wlg; (6)
where w denotes the wage. This problem gives the labor demand l(k;z;w) and the output
supply y (k;z;w) = F (k;l(k;z;w);z):
The ￿rm can also make investments x to increase its capital stock so that the capital stock
in the next period k0 satis￿es:
k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)k + x; (7)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the depreciation rate. Investments incur adjustment costs. For
simplicity, we consider the quadratic adjustment cost function,  x2=(2k); widely used in the
empirical investment literature (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). The ￿rm￿ s problem is
then to choose investment and ￿nancial policies so as to maximize its equity value.
Let V (k;z;w) denote equity value at the state (k;z) given that the equilibrium steady-state
wage rate is w: Then by (5), V (k;z;w) satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
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+ d = (1 ￿ ￿c)￿ (k;z;w) + ￿c￿k + s; (9)
9d ￿ 0; (10)
s ￿ 0: (11)
Equation (9) describes the ￿ ow of funds condition for the ￿rm. The source of funds consists of
after-tax pro￿ts, depreciation allowances, and new equity issuance. The use of funds consists of
investment expenditure, adjustment costs, and dividend payments.9 Dividend payments cannot
be negative. We thus impose constraint (10). There may be further constraints on dividend
payments. For example, one may assume that the ￿rm should pay a fraction of earnings as
dividends (e.g., Auerbach (2002) and Poterba and Summers (1983)). The motivation for a
constraint like this typically comes from asymmetric information problems or agency problems
between managers and shareholders, and lies outside the purpose of our present investigation.
While share repurchases are allowed in the United States, there are several reasons to think
that share repurchases are either e⁄ectively constrained or costly. Regular share repurchases
may lead the IRS to treat the repurchases as dividends, thus erasing their tax advantage.
Additional repurchase costs may arise as a result of asymmetric information (see, e.g., Brennan
and Thakor (1990) and Barclay and Smith (1988)). For simplicity, we follow most papers in
the literature to impose constraint (11).10 Because we rule out share repurchases, the baseline
model here cannot address the ￿dividend puzzle￿which asks why ￿rms pay dividends given the
tax advantage of share repurchases. In Section 6.4, we will relax this assumption and follow
Poterba and Summers (1985) to impose a constraint that share repurchases are bounded by
some maximal amount. We refer the reader to Gordon and Dietz (2006) for a survey of models
of the dividend puzzle.
By a standard dynamic programming argument (e.g., see Hennessy and Whited (2005),
or Stokey and Lucas (1989), one can show that there is a unique value function V satisfying
the Bellman equation (8). Also V is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in k.
Thus, there exist unique decision rules denoted by
x = x(k;z;w); k0 = g (k;z;w); s = s(k;z;w); d = d(k;z;w): (12)
9Note that we treat the adjustment cost as part of investment expenditures so that it is not tax deductible.
One may treat the adjustment cost as part of wage bill so that it is tax deductible. This alternative modeling
does not change our key insights.
10See, for example, Auerbach (1979b, 2002), Gomes (2001), Bond and Meghir (1994), Desai and Goolsbee
(2004), Hennessy and Whited (2005).
103.2 Stationary Distribution and Aggregation
Because there is a continuum of ￿rms that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, there is a cross
sectional distribution ￿ of ￿rms over the state (k;z): By Stokey and Lucas (1989), the law of
motion for the ￿rm distribution is given by:
￿0 (A ￿ B) =
Z
1g(k;z;w)2AQ(z;B)￿(dk;dz); (13)
where 1 is an indicator function, and A and B are Borel sets. Note that we suppress the
dependence of distributions on the wage w: When ￿0 = ￿ = ￿￿; we call ￿￿ the stationary
distribution. Given the stationary distribution ￿￿, we can compute the following aggregate
quantities:
￿ aggregate output supply,
Y (￿￿;w) =
Z
y (k;z;w)￿￿ (dk;dz); (14)
















The representative household derives utility from consumption and leisure according to the




where ￿ is the discount factor, Ct denotes consumption, Lt denotes labor supply, and U satis￿es
U1 > 0; U11 < 0, U2 < 0, U22 < 0; and the Inada conditions. The household owns all ￿rms and
11trades ￿rms￿shares. In addition, the household also trades a risk-free bond in zero net supply.
He pays dividend taxes, personal income taxes, and capital gains taxes.11 Thus, the budget
constraint is given by:
Ct +
Z
Pt￿t+1d￿t + bt+1 (19)
=
Z ￿






￿td￿t + (1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)rt)bt + (1 ￿ ￿i)wtLt + Tt;
where ￿t denotes the shares owned by the household, bt denotes bond holdings, rt denotes the
interest rate, and Tt denotes the transfer from the government. In equilibrium, ￿t = 1 and
bt = 0:
The household￿ s problem is to choose consumption, labor supply, and trading strategies to
maximize his utility (18) subject to (19). We consider the household problem in a stationary
equilibrium in which the interest rate rt; the wage rate wt; and aggregate quantities are constant
over time. As in Gomes (2001), one can show that in a stationary equilibrium the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (the pricing kernel) is equal to ￿: Thus, the interest rate satis￿es:
￿ (r(1 ￿ ￿i) + 1) = 1; (20)
and the required return to equity is given by (2). In addition, in the steady state, the household￿ s





C = (1 ￿ ￿d)
Z
d(k;z;w)￿￿ (dk;dz) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)
Z
s(k;z;w)￿￿ (dk;dz) (22)
+(1 ￿ ￿i)wL + T (w;￿￿);
where T (w;￿￿) is the steady-state transfer. This problem gives decision rules for consumption
C (w;￿￿;T (w;￿￿)) and labor supply Ls (w;￿￿;T (w;￿￿)):
3.4 Government
Because the focus of the paper is on the distortionary e⁄ect of dividend taxation on investment,
we assume that tax revenues collected by the government are rebated to the household in a
11According to the U.S. tax system, capital losses are tax deductible within some limit. For tractability, we
ignore this limit in our model.
12lump-sum manner. Thus, we abstract from other distortionary e⁄ects associated with using
distortionary taxation to ￿nance government spending on goods and services. Incorporating
government spending would complicate our analysis since a tax cut must eventually be ￿nanced
with some combination of other tax increases or spending cuts. We also do not consider
government debt. The analysis of how the dividend and capital gains tax cut is ￿nanced is
beyond the scope of the present paper and is left for future research. In Section 6.1, we extend
our model to allow for revenue-neutral tax reform by shifting from dividend taxation to labor
income taxation.
Because the government collects corporate income taxes, dividend taxes, personal income
taxes, and capital gains taxes, and transfers these tax revenues to the household, the government
budget constraint is given by:
T = ￿c
Z







A stationary equilibrium consists of a constant wage rate w; a stationary distribution of
￿rms ￿￿; aggregate quantities, C (￿￿;w); I (￿￿;w); ￿(￿￿;w); Y (￿￿;w); Ld (￿￿;w), Ls (￿￿;w);
T (w;￿￿); and decision rules, k0 = g (k;z;w); x = x(k;z;w); s = s(k;z;w); d = d(k;z;w);
such that (i) the decision rules solve the ￿rm￿ s problem (8); (ii) C (w;￿￿;T (w;￿￿)) and
Ls (w;￿￿;T (w;￿￿)) solve the problem by (21); (iii) ￿￿ satis￿es equation (13) and aggregate
quantities satisfy equations (14)-(17); (iv) T (w;￿￿) satis￿es the government budget constraint
(23); and (v) markets clear,
Ld (￿￿;w) = Ls (￿￿;w); (24)
C (￿￿;w) + I (￿￿;w) + ￿(￿￿;w) = Y (￿￿;w): (25)
4 Analysis of A Single Firm￿ s Decision Problem
In order to analyze the general equilibrium e⁄ects of a dividend tax cut, we ￿rst analyze a
single ￿rm￿ s decision problem in partial equilibrium. We thus ￿x the wage rate and suppress
the variable w throughout this section.






















+ dt = (1 ￿ ￿c)￿ (kt;zt) + ￿c￿kt + st; (27)
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + xt; (28)
dt ￿ 0; (29)
st ￿ 0: (30)
Let qt; ￿d
t ￿ 0 and ￿s
t ￿ 0 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (28)-
(30), respectively. As is well known, qt can be interpreted as the shadow price of capital and







t = 1; (31)












kt+1 : qt =
1
1 + r(1 ￿ ￿i)=(1 ￿ ￿g)
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We also have the usual transversality condition and the complementary slackness condition,
which are omitted here for simplicity.
4.1 Financial Policy
We start by analyzing the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial policy, holding the investment policy ￿xed. This
￿nancial policy is determined by equation (31), which has the following interpretation. Raising
one unit of new equity to pay dividends relaxes the dividend constraint and the share repurchase
constraint. In addition, the shareholder receives (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) units of after-tax dividends.
Thus, the expression on the left side of (31) represents the marginal bene￿t to the shareholder.
14On the other hand, one unit increase in new share lowers equity value by one unit and hence
the expression on the right side of (31) gives the marginal cost to the shareholder. Equation
(31) requires that the preceding marginal bene￿t and marginal cost must be equal at optimum.
If ￿d = ￿g; then there is no tax di⁄erential between dividends and retained earnings. Equa-
tion (31) implies that ￿d
t = ￿s
t = 0: In this case, the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial policy is irrelevant. That
is, it does not matter for ￿rm value and investment policy how much earnings to retain for use
as internal ￿nance, rather than distributing dividends and raising new equity in the external
equity market. More formally, in the ￿rm￿ s problem (26), the payout dt￿st can be determined.
However, dividends dt and new equity st are indeterminate. This is the celebrated Miller and
Modigliani (1961) dividend policy irrelevance theorem.
However, if ￿d 6= ￿g; then the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial policy matters. Before the 2003 dividend tax
cut, the tax rate on dividends in the United States was higher than the tax rate on capital
gains, so we assume that ￿d > ￿g: In this case, it follows from (31) that we cannot have
￿d
t = ￿s
t = 0. That is, it is not optimal for the ￿rm to simultaneously issue new equity
and distribute dividends. The intuition is simple. New equity or share repurchases change
equity value and hence capital gains. Thus, they are taxed at the capital gains rate ￿g: By
contrast, dividends are taxed at a higher rate ￿d: To maximize equity value, the ￿rm should
reduce dividends, but repurchase shares to the extent possible. This implies that one of the
constraints (10) and (11) must be binding. This observation gives us three cases to consider.
Each case corresponds to a di⁄erent ￿nance regime (also see Hennessy and Whited (2005) and
Stiglitz (1973)).
In the ￿rst case, dt > 0 and st = 0. We call this case the dividend distribution regime.
In this regime, the ￿rm has enough retained earnings to ￿nance investment and to distribute
dividends. In addition, the ￿rm has exhausted opportunities to repurchase shares so that the
share repurchase constraint binds, st = 0. This regime corresponds to the ￿new view￿ of
dividend taxation. In the second case, dt = 0 and st > 0: We call this case the equity issuance
regime. In this regime, the ￿rm does not have enough internal funds to distribute dividends.
Instead, the ￿rm reduces dividends to the extent possible so that the nonnegative dividend
constraint binds, dt = 0: In addition, the ￿rm has unused opportunities to repurchase shares
in that st > 0: The marginal source of investment ￿nance is the external equity market. This
regime re￿ ects the traditional view of divided taxation. In the third case, dt = 0 and st = 0.
15We call this case the liquidity constrained regime. In this regime, the ￿rm exhausts all internal
funds to ￿nance investment and hence does not distribute dividends. In addition, the ￿rm does
not issue new equity because the marginal return to investment does not justify the reduction in
equity value due to share dilution. In this regime, a windfall addition to current earnings, which
conveys no information about the ￿rm￿ s future pro￿tably, will raise investment. The presence
of ￿rms in this regime may account for the excess sensitivity of investment to measures of
internal funds.
We should emphasize that ￿nance regimes may change over time because of the stochastic
productivity shocks and the intertemporal investment policy. As will be discussed later, this
implies that we cannot simply do comparative statics based on the current source of marginal
￿nance only. In addition, in the cross section with ￿rm heterogeneity, di⁄erent ￿rms may lie in
di⁄erent ￿nance regimes. We next turn to the ￿rm￿ s investment policy.
4.2 Investment Policy
We ￿rst derive a q-theoretic investment equation and then derive the user cost of capital.
Based on this derivation, we analyze the e⁄ect of dividend taxation on investment in partial
equilibrium. This analysis generalizes Auerbach (1979b), Edward and Keen (1984), and Poterba
and Summers (1985) to include adjustment costs.
4.2.1 q Theory














This equation is a simple variant of the estimation equation widely used in the q-theory lit-
erature on dividend taxation (Desai and Goolsbee (2004) and Poterba and Summers (1983,
1985)). It highlights the key di⁄erence between the traditional and the new views of dividend
taxation.
According to the traditional view, the marginal source of ￿nance is new equity. In this case,
￿d
t > 0; ￿s






(qt ￿ 1): (35)
16Thus, investment is determined by the point at which the shareholder is indi⁄erent between
holding a dollar inside or outside the ￿rm. That is, the ￿rm stops investment when qt is equal to
1. According to the new view, the marginal source of ￿nance is retained earnings. In addition,
the ￿rm distributes dividends and hence ￿d












Thus, the shareholder will stop investing when he is indi⁄erent between receiving dividends,
with value (1 ￿ ￿d); and having the dollar invested, yielding (1 ￿ ￿g)qt: That is, he will stop
investing when qt = (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) < 1:
Given equations (35)-(36), a natural empirical strategy to test the traditional and the new
views of dividend taxation is to test which one of these two equations ￿ts the data better (e.g.,
Desai and Goolsbee (2004) and Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985)). We should emphasize that
the assumption underlying the standard q-theory approach to estimation (Hayashi (1982)) is
violated here since we have assumed decreasing returns to scale. Thus, the substitution of
average for marginal q produces a measurement error (see Gomes (2001)). As pointed out by
Cooper and Ejarque (2003), this misspeci￿cation of q-theory based models implies that any
inferences about the size of the quadratic adjustment cost or the signi￿cance about ￿nancial
variable may be invalid.
What seems counterintuitive is that under the traditional view tax parameters do not enter
(35), but they appear in (36). In fact, the intuition is easy to explain. Solving equation (33)




























This equation simply says that marginal q re￿ ects the ￿rm￿ s marginal valuation. Thus, a change
in dividend tax rate changes q and hence in￿ uences investment under the traditional view.
However, under the new view, dividend taxes are fully capitalized in equity value (￿d
t+j = 0 for
all j), and thus the dividend tax parameter in q fully o⁄sets the factor (1 ￿ ￿g)=(1 ￿ ￿d) in
(36). This implies that dividend taxation has no e⁄ect on marginal investment.
17To formalize the above intuition more transparently, we use equations (32)-(33) to obtain




































The expression on the left side of (39) represents the marginal cost of investment, while the
expression on the right side represents the marginal bene￿t from investment.
From equation (39), we can see clearly that if the marginal source of ￿nance does not change
in two adjacent periods, i.e., ￿d
t = ￿d
t+1, then dividend tax does not in￿ uence investment policy
at date t; ceteris paribus, since the factors (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g)+￿d
t and (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g)+￿d
t+1
cancel out in equation (39).12 Thus, the condition that the current marginal source of ￿nance
is retained earnings is not necessary for the new view of dividend taxation to hold true. Even
if the current marginal source of ￿nance is new equity, dividend taxation has no e⁄ect on the
current marginal investment if the return to investment is used to reduce equity issuance in
the next period. This point has been made by Edwards and Keen (1984) in a model without
adjustment costs.
When the current marginal source of ￿nance is new equity, i.e., ￿d
t > 0 and ￿s
t = 0, but the
return to investment is used to pay dividends, i.e., ￿d
t+1 = 0; then (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿d
t = 1
and (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿d
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) in equation (39). Thus, a decrease in the
dividend tax rate ￿d raises the after-tax marginal return to investment and hence raises the
current investment xt, ceteris paribus. This result re￿ ects the traditional view of dividend
taxation.
When the current marginal source of ￿nance is retained earnings, i.e., ￿d
t = 0, but the
return to investment is used to reduce equity issuance in the next period, i.e., ￿d
t+1 > 0 and
￿s
t+1 = 0; then (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿d
t = (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) and (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿d
t+1 = 1
in equation (39). Thus, a decrease in the dividend tax rate ￿d raises marginal cost and hence
reduces investment xt, ceteris paribus. This result seems counterintuitive. In fact, if the ￿rm
uses current retained earnings to ￿nance an additional $1 of investment, then the shareholder
12We should emphasize that the ￿rm￿ s investment policy is dynamic and thus the date t investment xt depends
on the date t + 1 investment xt+1. Here we focus on the e⁄ect on xt (or kt+1) by holding xt+1 constant. A




of dividends. Thus, a dividend tax cut makes this cost higher, but does not
change the bene￿t if the return to investment is used to reduce equity issuance in the next
period.
Finally, when the ￿rm is in the liquidity constrained regime, we have ￿d
t > 0 and ￿s
t > 0.
Then the ￿rm does not raise new equity or pay dividends. Investment is constrained to be the
retained earnings, xt = (1 ￿ ￿c)￿ (kt;zt) + ￿c￿kt; which do not depend on dividend taxation.
Figure 3 illustrates the determination of the optimal investment policy for the case without
adjustment cost (  = 0). When the investment demand is low, as with the MB1 schedule,
investment spending can be ￿nanced from internal funds, at the expense of extra dividends.
The marginal cost is equal to (1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g): By contrast, for high investment demand, as
with the MB3 schedule, the ￿rm raises new equity and the marginal cost is equal to 1. For an
intermediate level of investment demand, as with the MB2 schedule, the ￿rm is constrained to
invest at the amount of retained earnings (1 ￿ ￿c)￿ (k;z) + ￿c￿k:
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
4.2.2 User Cost of Capital
We can also analyze the e⁄ects of dividend taxation on investment using the user cost of capital
framework following Jorgenson (1963). To simplify the analysis, we consider the deterministic
case only. We generalize Abel￿ s (1990) and Jorgenson￿ s (1963) de￿nition of the user cost of
capital to include adjustment cost and dividend taxation. We de￿ne the user cost of capital as
the cost ut such that it is equal to the after-corporate-tax marginal cash ￿ ow of an additional
unit of capital, i.e.,
















[qt (r(1 ￿ ￿i)=(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿) ￿ ￿qt (1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ ￿￿c; (41)
where ￿qt = qt+1 ￿ qt: Thus, the user cost of capital is equal to the sum of the tax-adjusted
interest rate, physical depreciation, and the capital loss, minus depreciation allowance. Impor-
tantly, it depends on the ￿rm￿ s dynamic ￿nance regimes as re￿ ected by the marginal q and the
￿rst factor in equation (41).





























Removing the expectation operator in equation (39) and using equation (40), we observe that
equations (42) and (39) are equivalent. Thus, we may derive essentially identical results based
on the e⁄ects of dividend taxation on the user cost of capital. Speci￿cally, if the ￿rm￿ s ￿nance
regime does not change in two adjacent periods, then the dividend tax cut does not change
the user cost of capital and hence does not change the current investment, as predicted by the
new view of dividend taxation. If the ￿rm￿ s ￿nance regime changes from the equity issuance
regime to the dividend distribution regime, then the dividend tax cut reduces the user cost of
capital and hence raises the current investment, as predicted by the traditional view of dividend
taxation. By contrast, if the ￿rm￿ s ￿nance regime changes from the dividend distribution regime
to the equity issuance regime, then the dividend tax cut raises the user cost of capital and hence
lowers the current investment.
We have pointed out before that if ￿d = ￿g; then the Miller-Modigliani dividend irrelevance
theorem holds and ￿d
t = ￿d
t+1 = 0: We can then use equation (42) to show that a cut of the
common tax rate ￿d = ￿g lowers the user cost of capital and hence raises investment for a ￿rm
in any ￿nance regime. This result is useful for understanding our policy experiments in Section
5.
4.3 Importance of Firm Heterogeneity
To understand the importance of heterogeneity in determining the steady-state e⁄ect of the
dividend tax reform, we consider the case where there is only one representative ￿rm in the
model described in Section 3. Also we suppose there is no uncertainty. Because aggregate
consumption in a steady state is constant over time, equation (20) determines the interest rate.
In addition, equations (31)-(33) still describe the representative ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order conditions,
except that we remove the shock variable zt and the expectation operator. Because kt = kt+1;
xt = ￿kt; and ￿d
t = ￿d
t+1 for all t in a deterministic steady state, it follows from (39) that the
steady-state capital stock k￿ satis￿es:
1 +  ￿ =
1
1 + r(1 ￿ ￿i)=(1 ￿ ￿g)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿c)￿1 (k￿) + ￿c￿ +  ￿2=2 + (1 +  ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
: (43)
20This equation implies that in a model without ￿rm heterogeneity, dividend taxation does not
in￿ uence the steady-state capital stock. This is because the representative ￿rm can ￿nance its
investment using retained earnings in the deterministic steady state and its ￿nance regime does
not change over time. By contrast, in our model with ￿rm heterogeneity, because of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, ￿rms face di⁄erent ￿nance regimes and respond to a dividend tax cut in
di⁄erent ways. Thus, a dividend tax cut will in￿ uence the steady-state capital stock. In the
next section, we analyze its quantitative e⁄ects.
5 Quantitative Results
We now turn to the general equilibrium model presented in Section 3. Because this model
does not permit a closed-form solution for the stationary equilibrium, we resort to a numerical
method to compute the approximate equilibrium. Appendix B details our numerical method.
5.1 Baseline Parametrization
To solve the model numerically, we need to specify functional forms for utility and technology.
We also need to assign parameter values. We assume a time period in the model corresponds
to one year. We calibrate our baseline model to match some moments obtained from the
COMPUSTAT database. The sample period ranges from 1988 to 2002, which corresponds to
the period before the dividend tax cut. Appendix A describes the data construction.
Tax system. It is delicate to calibrate tax rates since in reality they are nonlinear and change
each year, while we have assumed constant and ￿ at rates in our model. In order to evaluate
the 2003 dividend tax reform, we suppose that the initial steady state tax rates are given by
the federal statutory rates in 2003 before the tax reform. We thus set the corporate income
tax rate ￿c = 0:34: Dividend tax rate, personal income tax rate, and capital gains tax rate
depend on the individual￿ s income tax bracket. We suppose the representative household has
an average income in the US, which falls into the lowest of the top four tax brackets at the
personal income tax rate ￿i = 0:25: This household faces the capital gains tax rate ￿g = 0:20:
Because dividends are taxed at the personal income tax rate, we set ￿d = 0:25:
21Preferences. We take the utility function:




where h > 0 is the weight on leisure. This utility function has a unit Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, which is reasonable for macro models as argued by Hall (2008). We choose the discount
factor ￿ such that the interest rate r is equal to 0:04 using equation (20). We choose the
parameter h to match the equilibrium labor supply of 0:3; which is the average fraction of time
spent on market work.
Technology. We choose the Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to
scale, F (k;l;z) = zk￿kl￿l; where 0 < ￿k;￿l < 1 and ￿k + ￿l < 1: We assume that the
productivity shock follows the process,
lnzt = ￿lnzt￿1 + "t; (45)
where "t is i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2: In appendix C, we
detail the procedure for calibrating the parameter values ￿k; ￿l; ￿; and ￿: We ￿nd ￿ = 0:767;
￿ = 0:211, ￿k = 0:311; and ￿l = 0:650: These estimates are similar to those in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), Gomes (2001), or Hennessy and Whited (2005). We set the depreciation
rate to match the aggregate investment-capital ratio, which is equal to 0.095 according to the
National Income and Product Accounts.
The ￿nal parameter to be calibrated is the adjustment cost parameter  . Because the
volatility (standard deviation) of the investment rate is very sensitive to this parameter, we
choose a value to match the cross-sectional volatility of the investment rate in our data, which
is 0:156. More speci￿cally, for any given value of  ; we solve the model numerically and obtain
the stationary distribution of ￿rms. Using this stationary distribution, we compute the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the investment rate in the model. If there were no adjustment
cost, our model would imply excessive sensitivity of investment to variations in productivity
shocks, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence. Our calibrated value of   is equal to
1:080; which is similar to the estimates reported by Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994),
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), and Gilchrist and Sim (2006). However, this value is higher
than the value (0.049) estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and is lower than the value
(about 20) estimated in the early investment literature.
22In summary, we list the calibrated parameter values in Table 3. In Section 5.6, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis for parameters ￿; ￿ and   since these parameter values are important for
our quantitative results.
Table 3. Baseline parametrization
Parameter Value
Corporate income tax ￿c 0.340
Personal income tax ￿i 0.250
Dividend tax ￿d 0.250
Capital gain tax ￿g 0.200
Exponent on capital ￿k 0.311
Exponent on labor ￿l 0.650
Shock persistence ￿ 0.767
Shock standard deviation ￿ 0.211
Depreciation rate ￿ 0.095
Discount factor ￿ 0.971
Weight on leisure h 6.616
Adjustment cost   1.080
5.2 Baseline Model Results
We suppose that the economy under the parameter values in Table 3 before the tax cuts has
reached the steady state. We solve for this steady state numerically. Before reporting aggregate
and cross sectional moments, it proves useful to consider ￿rst the ￿nance regimes for the ￿rms
in the cross section. As analyzed in Section 4.2, ￿rms in di⁄erent ￿nance regimes may respond
to the dividend tax cut in di⁄erent ways. Figure 4 illustrates these regimes for the baseline
model and reveals a few interesting features similar to those in Gomes (2001). First, ￿rms
that are either very small or very productive tap the equity market and do not distribute
dividends. They are in the equity issuance regime. Second, ￿rms that are either very large or
less productive use internal funds to ￿nance investment and also distribute dividends. They are
in the dividend distribution regime. Finally, the remaining ￿rms do not distribute dividends
and do not issue new equity. They are in the liquidity constrained regime. Unlike the Gomes
(2001) model in which these di⁄erent ￿nance regimes arise due to transactions costs of external
￿nancing, our model generates these ￿nance regimes because of the di⁄erential tax treatment
on dividends and capital gains.
23[Insert Figure 4 Here]
We next turn to the aggregate and cross-sectional results. Table 4 reports these results.
From this table, one can see that our baseline model matches most aggregate and cross-sectional
moments reasonably well. However, the model overpredicts the ratio of aggregate dividends
to aggregate earnings, perhaps because we abstract from share repurchases, another way of
distribution. The model also underpredicts the standard deviation of the ratio of earnings to
capital. This could be due to the fact that there are shocks to earnings other than productivity
in the data that our model does not capture.
Table 4. Aggregate and cross-sectional moments in the baseline model. The invest-
ment rate is computed from the National Income Accounts and the other data moments are
computed using COMPUSTAT. See Appendix B for the variable de￿nition. Model moments
are computed using parameter values listed in Table 3.
Variable Data Model
Investment rate 0.095 0.095
Aggregate dividends/earnings 0.137 0.353
Aggregate new equity/investment 0.130 0.148
Volatility of investment rate 0.156 0.156
Autocorrelation of investment rate 0.596 0.648
Volatility of earnings/capital 0.623 0.175
Autocorrelation of earnings/capital 0.791 0.658
Table 5 reports the distribution of ￿rms across ￿nance regimes. This table reveals that
there is only a small fraction (20.1 percent) of ￿rms in the equity issuance regime in the steady
state. These ￿rms are smaller than average, since they account for only 10.8 percent of total
capital. However these ￿rms account for quite a lot of investment. These results re￿ ect the fact
that most ￿rms do not tap the equity market since equity issuance is costly due to the di⁄erent
tax treatment of capital gains and dividends. In addition, those ￿rms that tap the equity
market are small and productive, and hence have higher Tobin￿ s q and make more investment.
These patterns are qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Table 1.
Quantitatively, the model matches well the fraction of ￿rms across the three ￿nance regimes,
and matches roughly the patterns for earnings, investment, and Tobin￿ s q. We think this is a
24reasonable success of our model given that our model is very parsimonious. In particular, the
shock process and returns-to-scale parameters are estimated from the data and are not picked
to match the ￿rm distribution. The only ￿free￿technology parameter is the adjustment cost
parameter.
Table 5. Distribution of ￿rms across ￿nance regimes in the baseline model. The
share of ￿rms for a regime is equal to the total number of ￿rms in that regime divided by
the total number of ￿rms in all regimes. The share of capital (resp. investment) for a regime
is equal to the total capital stock (resp. investment) of the ￿rms in that regime divided by
aggregate capital stock (resp. investment) of all ￿rms. The earnings-capital ratio for a regime
is equal to the earnings of the ￿rms in that regime divided by their total capital stock, i.e. it
is capital-weighted. The investment-capital ratio and Tobin￿ s q are computed in a similar way.
Parameter values are listed in Table 3.
Equity Liquidity Dividend
Issuance Regime Constrained Regime Distribution Regime
Share of ￿rms 0.201 0.342 0.457
Share of capital 0.108 0.229 0.663
Share of investment 0.402 0.436 0.161
Earnings-capital ratio 0.431 0.264 0.170
Investment-capital ratio 0.354 0.181 0.023
Average Tobin￿ s q 2.633 1.941 1.348
We notice that our model underpredicts the earnings and investments of ￿rms in the divi-
dend distribution regime, compared to the data. As shown in Figure 4, ￿rms in the dividend
distribution regimes may have large capital stocks, but low productivity, relative to ￿rms in
other ￿nance regimes. Thus, ￿rms in the dividend distribution regime have a low Tobin￿ s q, low
investments, and large distributions. Introducing other shocks such as shocks to pro￿ts to in-
duce these ￿rms to make more investments may remedy this defect somewhat. Our model does
not match well the shares of capital and investment reported in Table 1. In the data, ￿rms in
the equity issuance regime are very small. While our model captures this feature qualitatively,
it does not match it quantitatively. This is because the size distribution has less dispersion in
the model than in the data. Nevertheless, because our model matches well the distribution of
￿rms across ￿nance regimes reported in Table 1 and also matches well the aggregate equity
issuance reported in Table 4, which are the key statistics for understanding the e⁄ects of the
25dividend tax reform, we view our model as a reasonable starting point for policy analysis.
5.3 E⁄ects of Dividend Tax Reform
To estimate the quantitative long-run e⁄ects of the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax cuts
as discussed in Section 2, we consider four policy experiments. Our experiments assume that
the tax rate changes are permanent in order for us to study the long-run steady-state e⁄ects.
To help understand the model mechanism, we begin by the ￿rst hypothetical experiment in
which we ￿x the capital gains tax rate at the 20 percent level, while the dividend tax rate
is cut to the 22 percent level. Column 2 of Table 6 reports the aggregate results. Because
dividends are taxed at a lower rate in this experiment, ￿rms distribute more dividends. Because
(1 ￿ ￿d)=(1 ￿ ￿g) < 1 after the dividend tax cut in this experiment, outside equity ￿nance is
still more costly than internal ￿nance. However, the tax wedge is narrowed. Thus, as revealed
in Column 2 of Table 6, ￿rms raise more equity to ￿nance investment after the dividend tax
cut.
Table 6. Aggregate e⁄ects of the dividend tax reform in the baseline model. When
we change the dividend and capital gains tax rates, we ￿x all other parameter values as in Table
3. All results are measured in percentage change from the initial steady state before the reform.
￿d = 0:22 ￿d = 0:20 ￿d = 0:15 ￿d = 0
￿g = 0:20 ￿g = 0:20 ￿g = 0:15 ￿g = 0
Capital 0.27 0.52 4.26 13.95
Output 0.58 1.00 2.15 5.04
Consumption 0.38 0.63 1.30 2.91
Dividends 6.23 N/A N/A N/A
Equity Issuance 40.05 N/A N/A N/A
Wage 0.48 0.82 1.72 3.95
Firm value 3.40 5.78 10.52 24.09
Welfare 0.31 0.52 1.04 2.27
Column 2 of Table 6 also reveals that the long-run aggregate capital stock, output, con-
sumption, and wage all increase following the dividend tax cut. However, the increase is quite
small. This implies that the welfare e⁄ect of the dividend tax cut is also small, even though
the increase in dividends and ￿rm value is relative large. The welfare bene￿t can be measured
by the equivalent increase in consumption holding leisure constant, which is only 0:31 percent.
26Turn to the e⁄ect of the dividend tax cut on the wage rate. After the dividend tax cut there
are more ￿rms in the equity issuance regime and these ￿rms are pro￿table. These ￿rms invest
more and demand more labor causing the aggregate demand for labor to rise. In addition,
labor supply falls because the household receives higher payouts and hence is wealthier. Thus,
the equilibrium wage rate should go up. Consistent with this intuition, Column 2 of Table 6
reveals that the wage rate is increased by 0:48 percent after the dividend tax cut. The e⁄ect
on the equilibrium labor is ambiguous, depending on the relative magnitude of changes in the
labor supply and the labor demand. In all of our numerical experiments, the change in labor
demand dominates so that the equilibrium employment rises after the dividend tax reform.
To understand the e⁄ect on aggregate capital accumulation, we recall that ￿rm heterogene-
ity plays a key role. As shown in Section 4.3, if there were no ￿rm heterogeneity, dividend
taxes would have no e⁄ect on the steady-state capital stock. Table 7 illustrates the impor-
tance of ￿rm heterogeneity. Compared with Table 5, Table 7 reveals that after the dividend
tax cut, fewer ￿rms are constrained. That is, some ￿rms in the liquidity constrained regime
move to the equity issuance regime and some ￿rms move to the dividend distribution regime.
The ￿rms in the equity issuance regime account for most of the increase in investment. These
￿rms￿behavior is consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation. These changes in
the cross-sectional distribution of ￿rms are consistent with the empirical results reported in
Section 2.
Table 7. Distribution of ￿rms across ￿nance regimes for ￿d = 0:22 and ￿g = 0:20:
The share of ￿rms for a regime is equal to the total number of ￿rms in that regime dividend by
the total number of ￿rms in all regimes. The share of capital (resp. investment) for a regime
is equal to the total capital stock (resp. investment) of the ￿rms in that regime divided by
aggregate capital stock (resp. investment) of all ￿rms. The earnings-capital ratio for a regime
is equal to the earnings of the ￿rms in that regime divided by their total capital stock, i.e. it
is capital-weighted. The investment-capital ratio and Tobin￿ s q are computed in a similar way.
Except for ￿d and ￿g; other parameter values are listed in Table 3.
27Equity Liquidity Dividend
issuance regime constrained regime distribution regime
Share of ￿rms 0.248 0.259 0.493
Share of capital 0.138 0.169 0.693
Share of investment 0.517 0.325 0.158
Earnings-capital ratio 0.415 0.264 0.171
Investment-capital ratio 0.357 0.183 0.022
Average Tobin￿ s q 2.620 2.001 1.406
We next consider the second policy experiment in which we ￿x the capital gains tax rate
at the 20 percent level, while the dividend tax rate is cut further to this level. As a result,
￿rms do not face the tax di⁄erential cost of external equity ￿nance. Because there is no other
friction associated with external equity ￿nance in the baseline model, the celebrated Miller
and Modigliani dividend policy irrelevance theorem holds, as analyzed in Section 4.1. Thus,
in Column 3 of Table 6, the values of aggregate dividends and new equity are indeterminate
(marked as ￿N/A￿ ). Because ￿rms do not face any ￿nancing frictions after the second policy
experiment, the long-run aggregate capital stock, output, consumption, and wage all increase
more than that in the ￿rst policy experiment. In particular, aggregate capital is raised by 0:52
percent, and aggregate output is raised by 1:00 percent. The welfare increase measured by the
increase in aggregate consumption is still small, equal to 0:52 percent.
We now consider the third policy experiment in which both the capital gains tax rate and
the dividend tax rate are cut permanently to the same level of 15 percent. These tax cuts are
implemented by JGTRRA. Column 4 of Table 6 reports the results. Comparing with the second
policy experiment reported in Column 3, we can see that the increases in aggregate capital,
output, consumption, and wage are higher. In particular, aggregate capital and welfare increase
by 4:26 and 1:04 percent, respectively. This larger e⁄ect is caused by a di⁄erent channel in
addition to the preceding reallocation channel. From (8) or (26), we can see that the after-tax
interest rate is given by r(1 ￿ ￿i)=(1 ￿ ￿g): Thus, a decrease in ￿g = ￿d lowers the after-tax
interest rate and hence the user cost of capital for all ￿rms, as analyzed in Section 4.2.2. Our
numerical experiments illustrate that this channel has a larger impact than the reallocation
channel.
We ￿nally conduct the fourth experiment in which both dividend and capital gains taxes
are eliminated permanently. We ￿nd a much larger impact on the economy, because there is a
large decrease in the user cost of capital for all ￿rms in the economy. In particular, aggregate
28capital increases by 13:95 percent and welfare increases by 2:27 percent.
5.4 Productivity Gains
We have shown that a dividend tax cut stimulates long-run capital formation in our model with
￿rm heterogeneity. In our model, ￿rms with high productivity but with little capital issue new
equity. These ￿rms are primarily responsible for the increase in investment after the dividend
tax cut. When the dividend tax is reduced, some liquidity constrained ￿rms move to the equity
issuance regimes and they attract more capital and labor. Hence, the allocation of capital and
labor is more e¢ cient, which generates productivity gains.
To gauge the productivity gains quantitatively, we use two measures, aggregate labor pro-
ductivity (Y=L) and total factor productivity (Y=(K￿kL￿l)). To focus on the e⁄ect of dividend
taxes alone, we consider the changes of ￿d from 0:25 to 0:22 and 0:20, and ￿x all other para-
meter values as in Table 3. Table 8 reports the results. Row 2 of this table reveals that total
factor productivity (TFP) increases following the decrease in the dividend tax rate. To see the














































where E￿ and Cov￿ denote, respectively, the expectation and covariance operators for the
stationary distribution of ￿rms ￿. The covariance term represents the reallocation e⁄ect, which
captures the fact that capital may move among ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity shocks. If there
were no reallocation e⁄ect, the covariance term would be zero. If, in addition, production had
constant returns to scale ￿k = 1 ￿ ￿l; then TFP would be equal to E￿
￿
z1=￿k￿￿k ; which would
not change following a change in the dividend tax rate. However, we have assumed decreasing
returns to scale in our model.13 In addition, Row 4 of Table 8 reveals that the correlation
between capital and productivity shock is positive and increases following a decrease in the
dividend tax rate. Clearly, the higher this correlation, the more e¢ cient the allocation of
capital across ￿rms. Row 5 shows that the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of log capital on
13Jermann and Quadrini (2003) use a model with ￿nancial frictions and decreasing returns to scale in pro-
duction to explain the productivity gains in the 1990s. Unlike our model with taxation, they assume ￿nancial
frictions are generated by the enforcement problem of lending contracts.
29log ￿rm productivity also increases, re￿ ecting that ￿rms with high productivity have relatively
more capital. Thus, we should expect that TFP will increase if the dividend tax rate is lowered.
This intuition is con￿rmed in Row 2 of Table 8.
Table 8: Productivity gains from the dividend tax cut. When we change the dividend
tax rate, we ￿x all other parameter values as in Table 3.
￿d = 0:25 ￿d = 0:22 ￿d = 0:20
Percentage change in TFP 0.00 0.479 0.721
Percentage change in Y=L 0.00 0.430 0.818
Correlation between lnk and lnz 0.438 0.450 0.457
Regression coe¢ cient of lnk on lnz 1.203 1.268 1.312
We now turn to Row 3 of Table 8, which reveals that labor productivity (Y=L) increases
as the dividend tax rate decreases. To see the intuition, we use the Cobb-Douglas production
























From this equation, we can see clearly that the increase in labor productivity is due to the
increase in wage. The increase in wage is in turn due to the increase in capital since the latter
increase raises the marginal product of labor.
Table 8 also reveals that the magnitude of the productivity gain from the dividend tax cut is
not large. Since most of the output increase is due to an increase in productivity (TFP), rather
than to an increase in the stock of capital, this may explain why our simulated welfare e⁄ect
of the 2003 dividend tax reform is small, as reported in Table 6. We note that the magnitude
of the reallocation e⁄ect depends on the size of the adjustment cost. If adjustment costs are
smaller, the e⁄ect of a dividend tax cut on capital accumulation and productivity will be larger
since it is less costly to reallocate capital.
5.5 General Equilibrium E⁄ect
To appreciate our general equilibrium model, we conduct a hypothetical experiment by shutting
down the price feedback e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, we ￿x the wage rate at its level before the tax
30reform. At this wage, we use labor demand to determine aggregate employment by ignoring
the labor market-clearing condition (24). After solving the ￿rm￿ s problem, we can derive
aggregate investment and aggregate output. We then use the resource constraint to solve for
aggregate consumption.
We ￿nd that the increase in capital stock, output, and consumption in partial equilibrium
after the tax reform is much higher than that in general equilibrium. In particular, when the
tax rates on dividends and capital gains are cut to 15 percent, the increase in capital in partial
equilibrium is about 6 times larger than in general equilibrium, and the increase in consumption
in partial equilibrium is about 26 times larger than in general equilibrium. This experiment
demonstrates that using a partial equilibrium model to conduct policy evaluation can be quite
misleading.
To understand the remarkable di⁄erence between the partial and the general equilibrium
results, we derive the pro￿t function as follows:






1￿￿l (1 ￿ ￿l): (48)
We note that the wage rate rises after the tax reform in general equilibrium as reported in
Table 6. The preceding equation reveals that the increased wage lowers a ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and
hence its returns to investment. This equilibrium price feedback e⁄ect dampens the increase in
investment and hence output in general equilibrium. Our numerical experiments demonstrate
that the equilibrium price feedback is quantitatively signi￿cant.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Because the parameters of persistence ￿; volatility ￿; and adjustment cost   are potentially
important for our quantitative results, we now conduct sensitivity analysis by changing these
parameter values. When we change one of the parameters, we ￿x the other parameters at the
baseline values given in Table 3.
Table 9 reports aggregate and cross-sectional results for di⁄erent parameter values. From
this table, we ￿nd the following results: When the volatility ￿ is increased, ￿rms face larger
shocks to productivity, which leads them to go more frequently to the equity market and hence
raise more new equity. In addition, investment and earnings become more volatile and less
persistent since capital adjustment is faster.
31An increase in the persistence parameter ￿ raises the autocorrelation of the investment rate
and the earnings/capital ratio. It also raises the cross-sectional volatility of the investment rate




, is also increased when ￿ is increased. Thus, ￿rms issue more new equity
to ￿nance investment.
The most notable e⁄ect of an increase in the adjustment cost parameter   is to lower the
volatility of the investment rate. When   is increased from 0.5 to 1.5, the standard deviation of
the investment rate is lowered from 0.254 to 0.127. The increase in   also raises the persistence
of the investment rate since ￿rms adjust capital gradually.
Table 9. Moments for di⁄erent parameter values. When we change one parameter
value, we ￿x other parameter values as in Table 3.
Data ￿ = 0:65 ￿ = 0:85 ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:3   = 0:5   = 1:5
Aggregate dividends/earnings 0.137 0.290 0.435 0.296 0.413 0.481 0.315
Aggregate new equity/investment 0.130 0.007 0.340 0.010 0.294 0.419 0.069
Volatility of investment rate 0.156 0.098 0.224 0.076 0.208 0.254 0.127
Autocorrelation of investment rate 0.596 0.566 0.683 0.690 0.603 0.588 0.668
Volatility of earnings/capital 0.623 0.160 0.176 0.080 0.273 0.157 0.186
Autocorrelation of earnings/capital 0.791 0.557 0.732 0.720 0.588 0.647 0.662
Table 10 reports the results when the tax rates are cut to ￿d = ￿g = 0:15: This table reveals
that our estimates of the e⁄ects on capital, output and consumption in the baseline model
are not very sensitive to the choice of parameter values. In particular, for a wide range of
parameter values, the steady-state capital stock and output increase by 3 to 6 percent and 1
to 3 percent, respectively. Notably, the steady-state increase in consumption is almost always
below 2 percent. When the adjustment cost parameter is small (  = 0:5); the reallocation
e⁄ect and productivity gains from the tax cut are large, as discussed in Section 4.4. In this
case, the resulting increases in aggregate output, capital and consumption are relatively large.
Table 10. Sensitivity analysis of dividend tax reform for di⁄erent parameter values.
When we change one parameter value, we ￿x other parameter values as in Table 3. All results
are measured in percentage change from the initial steady state.
32Capital Output Consumption Wage
Baseline 4.26 2.15 1.30 1.72
￿ = 0:65 3.58 1.34 0.78 1.08
￿ = 0:85 5.40 2.32 1.38 1.86
￿ = 0:1 3.57 1.48 0.88 1.19
￿ = 0:3 5.36 2.34 1.39 1.88
  = 0:5 5.72 2.85 1.72 2.28
  = 1:5 4.06 1.89 1.15 1.50
6 Extensions
In this section, we consider extensions of our baseline model by relaxing some of our previous
assumptions. First, we consider a revenue-neutral tax reform. Second, we introduce debt
￿nancing. Third, we consider the e⁄ect of transaction costs of equity issuance. Finally, we
allow for share repurchases. When we relax one assumption, we hold everything else constant
as in the baseline model. We show that our estimates of the bene￿t from the 2003 dividend
tax cut will be reduced in these extensions.
6.1 Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform
Our baseline model assumes tax revenues are rebated back to the household. Tax revenues must
decrease after a dividend and capital gains tax cut. This means that the household receives
smaller lump-sum transfers from the government. If the government tries to keep tax revenues
constant after a dividend and capital gains tax cut, it must raise other taxes. If the taxes which
are increased are distortionary, the bene￿t from a dividend and capital gains tax cut will be
reduced.
To illustrate this point quantitatively, we consider an experiment in which the government
raises the personal (labor) income tax rate to keep tax revenues identical to the level before
the tax cut. We ￿nd that the equilibrium tax revenues are reduced by 3:1 percent after the
dividend and capital gains tax rates are cut to ￿d = ￿g = 0:15 from their baseline values.
To restore tax revenues to their level before the tax cut, the government must raise the tax
rate on labor income to ￿i = 0:266; 1:6 percentage point higher than the level before the tax
cut. This higher labor income tax rate distorts labor supply and thus reduces the bene￿t from
the dividend and capital gains tax cut. In particular, we ￿nd that aggregate capital, output,
and consumption increase by 3:23, 1:16, and 0:30 percent, respectively. These numbers are all
33smaller than the corresponding values (4:26, 2:15; and 1:30 percent) in our baseline model.
6.2 Debt Financing
Our baseline model assumes that the only source of outside ￿nancing is equity. However, ￿rms
also rely on debt to ￿nance investment (either through the bond market or through bank loans).
In this section we introduce debt ￿nancing in the model to study how it a⁄ects our results.
We follow Poterba and Summers (1983) and assume that debt is risk-free and is equal to a
￿xed fraction of capital: bt = ￿kt: This assumption may be motived by a binding collateral
constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).14 As a ￿rm accumulates more capital, it raises
its debt capacity in that capital is tantamount to collateral. This simple formulation simpli￿es
our numerical solution since we still solve the dynamic programming problem (8), but the ￿ ow




+ d + (1 + (1 ￿ ￿c)r)b = (1 ￿ ￿c)￿ (k;z;w) + ￿c￿k + s + b0; (49)
b = ￿k; b0 = ￿k0: (50)
To illustrate how our results are a⁄ected by this modi￿cation, we keep the same parameter
values as in Table 3, and set ￿ = 0:5: This number is in the range of estimates reported by
Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and is close to the estimates of Hennessy and Whited (2005). We
￿nd that equity issuance becomes smaller, because ￿rms can access to debt ￿nancing rather
than using internal funds or equity issuance only: The ratio of equity issuance to investment
is 5:0 percent rather than 14:8 percent. In addition, there are fewer ￿rms issuing equity (14:9
percent rather than 20:1 percent).
We next analyze the e⁄ects of the dividend tax cut by conducting experiments similar to
Table 6. We ￿nd that the e⁄ects on the wage, consumption, and equity issuance are smaller
than in the baseline model. This is because the reallocation e⁄ect is smaller with debt ￿nancing.
We also ￿nd that the increase in capital in the model with debt ￿nancing is a little larger than
in the baseline model when we reduce ￿d alone to 0:20 (0:71 percent versus 0:52 percent), but is
a little smaller than in the baseline model when we reduce both ￿g and ￿d to 0:15 (2:81 percent
versus 4:26 percent). The intuition appears to be the following: On the one hand, when ￿rms
14In the case with occasionally binding collateral constraint as in Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Gourio
and Miao (2007), debt is an additional state variable. Our dynamic programming problem becomes three
dimensional, which is harder to solve numerically.
34can issue debt, they rely less on equity ￿nancing. Thus, reducing dividend taxes should have
a smaller e⁄ect than in the baseline model without debt ￿nancing. On the other hand, an
increase in capital in the model with debt relaxes the collateral constraint and allows ￿rms to
take on more debt, thereby stimulating more capital accumulation. For small tax changes, the
second e⁄ect dominates, but for large tax changes, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates.
6.3 Costly External Finance
So far, we have assumed that external equity ￿nance is costly only because of the di⁄erential tax
treatment on capital gains and dividends. Many researchers argue that outside equity markets
are costly because of asymmetric information or transactions costs. When there is a cost of
issuing equity, there is an additional wedge between internal and external funds. Thus, one
should expect the aggregate e⁄ects to be smaller even though the tax wedge is eliminated in
our previous policy experiments. We have con￿rmed this intuition numerically using a model
with linear cost of issuing equity (see Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2005)). For
instance, when the cost of equity issuance is 3 percent of the value of issued equity, a decrease
in the dividend tax rate to ￿g = 0:20 raises capital by only 0:33 percent, and a decrease in
dividend and capital gains tax rates to 0:15 raises capital by 3:91 percent (as compared to 0:52
and 4:26 percent, respectively, in the baseline model).
6.4 Share Repurchases
Share repurchases are allowed in the US. However, repurchases are not free. First, regular
repurchases may lead the IRS to treat repurchases as dividends. Second, there may be asym-
metric information and transactions costs. To model the costly share repurchases in a simple
way, we follow Poterba and Summers (1985) and assume that there is an upper bound on re-
purchases in that s ￿ s, where s is a negative number. Note that after one uses this constraint
to replace (11), the analysis in Section 4 still goes through with small notational changes. In
particular, ￿rms still face three ￿nance regimes: dividend distribution regime (d > 0;s = s), eq-
uity issuance regime (d = 0;s > s), and liquidity constrained regime (d = 0;s = s). Moreover,
the e⁄ect of the dividend tax cut is qualitatively the same.
Compared to the baseline model without share repurchases, the model here implies that
￿rms can avoid the more costly dividend distribution by repurchasing shares to the extent
35possible. Thus, one should expect that ￿rms pay smaller dividends. We show numerically that,
holding everything else constant, when the share repurchase constraint is gradually relaxed,
aggregate output, capital, consumption, equity issuance, and earnings are increased, but aggre-
gate dividends are reduced. The intuition is the following. When ￿rms can use the returns on
investments to repurchase shares, as opposed to distributing dividends which are more highly
taxed, the bene￿ts of investment e⁄ectively rise. Thus, ￿rms have incentives to make larger
investments and issue more new equity to ￿nance the investment, if possible.
We also ￿nd numerically that the e⁄ects of the dividend tax reform are smaller when ￿rms
can repurchase shares. The intuition is the following. If both dividend and capital gains tax
rates are cut down to the same level, then allowing for share repurchases does not change the
equilibrium allocations in the economy after the tax cut. This is because the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial
policy is irrelevant when there is no tax di⁄erential between dividends and capital gains, by
the Miller and Modigliani Theorem. Thus, given our discussion in the preceding paragraph,
aggregate capital, consumption, and output in the model with share repurchases should increase
less than those in the baseline model. In the extreme case where we remove the share repurchase
constraint (11) so that ￿rms can completely avoid dividend payments, dividend taxes have no
real e⁄ect on the economy. However, when the tax rates on both dividends and capital gains
are reduced to ￿d = ￿g = 0:15 as in JGTRRA, these tax cuts still have real e⁄ects through the
user cost of capital channel discussed in Section 4.2.2. We ￿nd that aggregate output, capital
and consumption increase by 1:14; 3:72; and 0:66 percent, respectively.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the long-run e⁄ects of
the dividend tax reform on aggregate capital accumulation. Firm heterogeneity in productivity
and general equilibrium play a key role in our analysis. This ￿rm heterogeneity implies that
￿rms still face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, even though the economy-wide aggregates
are constant over time in the long run. Thus, ￿rms may lie in di⁄erent ￿nance regimes over
time and respond to dividend taxation in di⁄erent ways. In particular, some ￿rms behave
according to the traditional view of dividend taxation and other ￿rms behave according to the
new view of dividend taxation. This is in sharp contrast to a model with a representative ￿rm,
which implies that dividend taxation has no e⁄ect on aggregate capital accumulation in the
36deterministic steady state as predicted by the new view. We also show that general equilibrium
is important for policy analysis. Using a partial equilibrium model may provide very misleading
quantitative estimates.
We use our calibrated model to provide an initial quantitative evaluation of the 2003 div-
idend tax reform. Our simulations suggest that cutting the dividend tax rate alone raises the
long-run capital stock by a small magnitude. In addition, it raises total factor productivity and
labor productivity. This result is primarily generated by the reallocation e⁄ect in our model
with tax frictions and decreasing returns to scale in production. When both dividends and
capital gains tax rates are cut down to the same level, aggregate e⁄ects are much larger. The
reason is that the user costs of capital for all ￿rms are reduced and this reduction has a larger
e⁄ect on capital formation. Our baseline model simulations show that when both dividend and
capital gains tax rates are cut from 25 and 20 percent, respectively, to the same 15 percent
level permanently, the aggregate long-run capital stock increases by about 4 percent. This
estimate may be viewed as an upper bound because it will be reduced when we incorporate
several extensions of our baseline model including revenue-neutral tax reform, debt ￿nancing,
costly external ￿nancing, and share repurchases.
While we have considered several extensions of our model, it would be still interesting to
generalize it along a few directions. First, our modeling of debt precludes a change in the
debt-capital ratio. It would be interesting to relax this assumption as in Gourio and Miao
(2007), Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), Miao (2005), and Moyen (2004), among others.
Second, given the fact that a dividend tax cut may be temporary, it would be interesting to
analyze both its temporary and permanent e⁄ects. We study this issue in Gourio and Miao
(2007). Third, we have assumed a representative agent in the model. Incorporating household
heterogeneity would allow us to provide a more interesting welfare analysis. Finally, we may
consider that the government collects taxes and issues debt to ￿nance expenditures. We can
then analyze how the dividend tax reform a⁄ects budget de￿cits.
37Appendices
A Data Construction
We use the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual data set from 1988 to 2002 and use the following
standard criteria to drop data (see, e.g., Hennessy and Whited (2005)). First, we delete ob-
servations of ￿rms whose primary SIC classi￿cation is between 6000 and 6999 or between 4900
and 4999, since our model is inappropriate for regulated or ￿nancial ￿rms. Second, we delete
observations of ￿rms with negative or zero values of book value of capital (item 8), sales (item
12), or assets (item 6). To avoid rounding errors, we also delete observations with book value
of capital less than one million dollars or assets less than two million dollars. Third, we delete
observations of ￿rms with missing data for assets (item 6), book value of capital (item 8), sales
(item 12), operating income before depreciation (item 13), investment (item 30), dividends
(item 21 plus item 19), equity issuance (item 108), and equity repurchases (item 115). Because
a large share of equity issuance is done by small ￿rms which may not be present in all the years
that we cover, we prefer not to balance the panel. We end up with 11,945 ￿rms and a total of
77,906 ￿rm-year observations.
We measure earnings using item 13. To reduce the impact of extreme observations, we also
￿winsorize￿ two variables (investment over capital and earnings over capital), using the 5th
and 95th percentiles as thresholds. To compute total equity issuance over total investment, we
use the gross equity issuance, i.e. the aggregate of item 108, over the aggregate of item 30.
B Numerical Method
To solve the model numerically, we proceed in three steps. First, for a given wage, we compute
the ￿rm￿ s optimal decision rules. Next, we compute the stationary distribution. Finally, we
check whether the labor market equilibrium condition holds; if not, we adjust the wage and go
back to the ￿rst step.15 We now provide more details about each step.
Step 1. Starting with a guess of wage, solve the ￿rm￿ s dynamic programming problem by
value function iteration on a grid. We use a grid with 300 points for capital and 10 points for
productivity. The grid for capital is ￿ner for low capital values. The lower bound for capital
15Our programs are available at the following web address: http://people.bu.edu/fgourio/research.html
38is 0:001 and the upper bound is chosen so that it binds with very small probabilities in a
stationary equilibrium. Changes in the grid do not a⁄ect the result signi￿cantly. The grid for
productivity is taken from Joao Gomes￿program, which implements the usual Tauchen and
Hussey (1991) approximation for an AR(1) process.
Step 2. After obtaining decision rules from step 1, we solve for the stationary distribution
of ￿rms ￿￿(k;z;w): To do so, we simply iterate on equation (13) de￿ned in the main text,
starting from a uniform distribution over (k;z):
Step 3. After obtaining the stationary distribution of ￿rms, we obtain the aggregate labor
demand Ld(w) =
P
k;z ￿￿(k;z;w)l(k;z;w): We then check whether the labor market clears.
There are two cases. If labor supply is ￿xed, we need to check that Ld(w) = 0:3. If labor
supply is elastic, we check the equation, U2(C;L)=U1(C;L) = (1 ￿ ￿i)w; where aggregate
consumption C is deduced from the resource constraint and the stationary distribution. If the
equilibrium condition is not satis￿ed, we use the bisection method to update the wage rate and
go back to step 1.
Because we solve the model on a grid, the policy function g(k;z;w) is necessarily discontin-
uous in the Euclidean norm. Hence labor demand can be discontinuous: a small change in the
wage can create a discrete jump in g(k;z;w) and thus in ￿￿(k;z;w): This implies we may not
be able to make the equilibrium condition hold with arbitrary precision. However, the error in
this equilibrium condition is very small for our computations, typically around 10￿5:
C Calibration of the Production Function and Shock Process
We follow an approach similar to that in Fuentes, Gilchrist and Rysman (2006), Gilchrist
and Sim (2006), and Moyen (2004), and estimate the production function parameters and
shock processes directly using the COMPUSTAT database. We choose these estimates as our
calibrated parameter values. Because our paper does not focus on structural estimation, we do
not use the simulated method of moments or indirect inference to estimate these parameters
as in Cooper and Ejarque (2003), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), or Hennessy and Whited
(2005, 2007).







39Our regression is based on this equation. To recover the exponents on the production function,
we run a simple regression of log real pro￿ts (item 13) on log real capital (item 8):
ln￿it = a + blnkit + ￿t + eit: (C.1)
This regression incorporates time ￿xed e⁄ects which capture variation in aggregate productiv-
ity, as well as aggregate in￿ ation. Note that we do not incorporate ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in this
regression. One reason is that our model has no ￿xed e⁄ect. Another one is that in a relatively
short sample, the ￿xed e⁄ect is likely to absorb some of the dynamics, biasing the estimate of
the shock process. Finally we ￿nd intrinsic permanent di⁄erences in ￿rms￿productivity hard
to square with the evidence on the turnover of the largest ￿rms (see, for instance, Comin and
Philippon (2005)). We recognize, however, that the absence of ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects may increase
the endogeneity problem in this production function estimation.
Our estimate of b is b b = 0:889: Following the macroeconomics literature, we set ￿l = 0:65
since labor share is approximately 65 percent in the US data. Given that b b is an estimate of
￿k=(1 ￿ ￿l); this yields an estimate of ￿k : b ￿k = 0:311:
We use the residuals from the regression (C.1) to measure the shock process. We ￿t an
AR(1) to ￿it = (1 ￿ ￿l)eit :
￿i;t = ￿￿i;t￿1 + ￿￿it;
where ￿it is i.i.d. across i and t and drawn from a standard normal distribution. These estimates
imply that the parameters of the shock process z are
b ￿ = 0:767; b ￿ = 0:211:
Overall, our estimates for parameters of the production function and the shock process are
quite similar to those in the papers cited above.
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Figure 1: Time series of aggregate corporate investment and ￿nancing behavior in
the data. Our data are drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. The data construction is
described in Appendix A.























Figure 2: Changes in ￿rm distribution across ￿nance regimes in the data. Our data
are drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. The data construction is described in Appendix A.



























































Figure 4: Finance regimes. This ￿gure illustrates the three ￿nance regimes. Region I
represents the equity issuance regime. Region II represents the liquidity constrained regime
and region III represents the dividend distribution regime.
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